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Abstract 
This paper develops a new international monetary framework for analysing the 
domestic and international repercussions of China’s exchange rate policy in the 
context of its rapid development.  This straightforward framework reveals that 
misalignment of the yuan against major currencies artificially assists China’s output 
growth, contributes to global imbalances and limits household consumption, slowing 
the rise in living standards.  Meanwhile, China’s Western trading partners, most 
notably the United States and the European Union, simultaneously experience 
external deficits, lower output and saving due to exchange rate misalignment.   
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1.  Introduction 
China’s remarkable integration into the world economy is the result of its 
international trade expanding at an annual average of 15 per cent, more than double 
the global rate over the past quarter century (IMF 2006).  This phenomenal trade 
growth has occurred in the context of astounding average annual real GDP growth 
rate of near 10 per cent over this time, the legacy of economic reforms initiated by 






Since 2000 China’s export growth has easily outpaced import growth giving rise to 
escalating trade and current account surpluses.  At a record 7 plus per cent of GDP, 
the current account surplus has become a major economic point of contention between 
China and its Western industrial economy trading partners, especially the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) experiencing large bilateral trade deficits 
with China.  Adding to international concerns about these global imbalances, the 
Bank for International Settlements (2006) has suggested they could pose a serious 
longer term problem for the global economy.  
 
Although other East Asian economies, including Japan and to a lesser extent South 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand and the oil exporting countries have also run sizeable 
trade surpluses with Western trading partners since 2000, China’s trade surplus has 
attracted most international policy attention because it has risen so sharply against a 
backdrop of such robust economic growth and a tightly managed exchange rate.  The 
inflexibility of China’s exchange rate contrasts with the prevalence of more flexible 
exchange rate regimes adopted by the majority of developing and emerging 
economies (Rogoff et al 2004).   
  
China’s international trade has benefited capital and resource intensive trading 
partners providing inputs for a China’s burgeoning manufacturing sector.  The 
dislocation of manufacturing industry in advanced economies that compete against 
low priced Chinese imports has invited direct trade policy “solutions’ such as higher 
tariffs on imports and export subsidies.   
 




partners are widely perceived as a trade competitiveness problem, especially at the 
manufacturing industry level, and in the US the large bilateral trade deficit with China 
has prompted proposed retaliatory action in the form of new tariffs against Chinese 
imports.  
  
Alternatively, the external imbalances between China and its trading partners have 
been interpreted as essentially international macroeconomic phenomena, based on 
differences in respective saving and investment behavior (see IMF 2007).  Yet there 
has been a paucity of macroeconomic-oriented analysis focusing explicitly on the 
nexus between China’s exchange rate policy and its relative output and expenditure 
flows.   
 
International macroeconomic accounting dictates that trade and current account 
imbalances reflect regional output-expenditure gaps (Alexander 1952) and these are 
strongly influenced over the short to medium run by overall competitiveness 
measured by real exchange rate movements.  Since the exchange rate is a shared 
variable, China’s external surplus reflecting excess production over expenditure has 
implications for the external deficits of Western trading partners which signify an 
excess of expenditure over production.   
 
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a straightforward 
alternative framework founded on the links between the exchange rate and output–
expenditure relations.  It first explains how exchange rate misalignment in China 
simultaneously influences global imbalances and macroeconomic conditions in both 




It is then used to predict the impact of an exchange rate re-alignment on these 
variables that would naturally occur if the yuan was more flexible. In view of the 
pivotal role exchange rate policy plays in China’s economic development strategy and 
the friction that it has created with its trading partners, the need to understand the 
domestic and international macroeconomic consequences of exchange rate choice 
mis-alignment remains as important as ever. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides as background a précis of 
China’s economic growth and trade performance before Section 3 develops a basic 
framework for interpreting role of the exchange rate in determining current account 
imbalances between China and its Western trading partners.  Section 4 then extends 
the framework to examine the consequences of the managed exchange rate regime 
and monetary policies on China’s macroeconomy and that of its trading partners’ in 
the context of China’s relatively higher growth rate.  Section 5 concludes by 
addressing some concerns about the impact of exchange rate re-alignment as well as 
canvassing complementary macroeconomic policy options.   
 
2.  China’s Growth and Trade  
China’s economic strength follows a quarter century of economic growth at an annual 
average of 9-10 per cent, some three times higher than the average growth rate of its 
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       Source: Based on data in IMF (2006a) 
Chart 1 - Economic Growth in China and Trading Partners 
These amazing growth rates have resulted from the economic liberalisation program 
including encouragement of foreign direct investment which continued in phases 
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s to the present.  Greater labour mobility, higher 
saving due to contraction of social welfare entitlements previously extended by the 
state sector and an improved investment climate for the private sector with less 
corruption have been other key factors underpinning output growth.   
 
The broadened capital stock resulting from high saving and investment has been 
combined with an urban workforce that has surged as controls over internal migration 
between rural to urban areas were eased from the mid 1990’s.  A new managerial 
class has emerged to start up predominately manufacturing enterprises and restructure 
privatised and reformed state-owned enterprises.  Meanwhile, the labour force is far 




Relative to the structure of advanced industrial economies, China has a 
disproportionately high tradable sector and small non-tradable sector.  As a ratio to 
GDP, its total exports plus imports of goods and services at near three quarters is well 
above comparable ratios for the United States, Japan and Germany.  The tradable 
sector is also disproportionately large compared to other large emerging countries at 
similar stages of development, such as Brazil.  In China, services industries, usually 
part of the non-tradable sector, have been officially discouraged relative to 
manufacturing.   
 
Following accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the 
liberalisation of international trade barriers has boosted export volumes.  However, 
high export growth at rates comparable to those of Japan and South Korea during their 
post-war take-off phases was evident before China joined the WTO.  Policies that 
have encouraged foreign direct investment have also substantially boosted exports by 
multinational firms (such as Motorola, Toshiba, Nokia and LG) operating in coastal 
China (Hale 2006). 
 
China’s current account surplus has grown markedly since the country became a 
member of the WTO in 2001 and essentially reflects the trade surplus component (see 
Chart 2).  The difference between the trade and overall current account surplus mainly 
reflects foreign interest income earned on the vast stock of international reserves of 
the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC).  As the trade account has 
essentially driven the current account balance, the two terms will be used 
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       Source: Based on data in IMF (2006a) 
Chart 2 - China's Exports, Imports and Current Account Surplus 
 
These persistent trade surpluses and capital inflow (overwhelmingly in the form of 
foreign direct investment) has enabled the PBC to amass a huge stock of foreign 
exchange reserves exceeding $US one trillion, most of which are in the form of US 
government securities (see Chart 3).  Extensive capital controls still impede financial 



























       Source: Based on data in IMF (2006a) 
Chart 3 - Gross International Reserves 
 
With such a large tradable sector centred mainly on producing manufactured goods, 
exchange rate management has minimised exchange rate uncertainty and thereby 
facilitated export growth.  But that has not been the only way a tightly controlled 
exchange rate has facilitated China’s exports and economic growth.  Exchange rate 
management has also contributed to economic development by maintaining 
competitiveness.   
 
As evident from Chart 4, China’s nominal effective exchange rate is significantly 
undervalued relative to its value on accession to the WTO in 2001, the period that co-
incides with the sharp rise in China’s trade and current account surplus.  Moreover, it 




rate measures that nominal exchange rate fluctuation has dominated relative price 
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     Source: Based on data from BIS (2007) 
Chart 4 – Exchange Rate Competitiveness since WTO Accession 
 
In light of China’s competitiveness position and its record of output growth 
persistently exceeding that of its trading partners, it is relevant to turn to the 
relationship between China’s output, expenditure, exchange rate policy and current 







3.  A Two Region Aggregate Output – Expenditure Framework 
This section develops a framework for examining China’s external account surplus 
and counterpart deficits of its trading partners with particular reference to its exchange 
rate policy.  In what follows, macroeconomic variables for trading partners that 
correspond to the same variables for China are denoted with an asterisk.   
 
The emphasis in international monetary theory on asset markets and capital account 
transactions as primary influences on the nominal exchange rate (see Branson 1983, 
Dornbusch and Fischer 1980, Frenkel and Mussa 1985, Isard 1995, Sarno and Taylor 
2002) contrasts with the traditional flow approach in which the exchange rate 
simultaneously equalizes net demand and supply of foreign currency arising from 
both current and capital account transactions. 
 
The real exchange rate influences aggregate output and expenditure and hence the 
current account balance.  For China, it is defined as 
P
eP
=   R
*
                                                                                             (1a) 
where e is the nominal effective exchange rate,   is China’s domestic price level and  P






= R            ( 1 b )  
 is the weighted nominal effective exchange rate of China’s trading partners.  where E
In what follows, it is assumed that the foreign and domestic price levels are stable in 




nominal exchange rate account for short term real exchange rate variation. 
 
The aggregate output or supply functions are specified as 
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             (2b) 
where ,  L K  and T  are the factor inputs labour, capital and technology used to 
produce national output, Y .  Nominal exchange rate depreciations improve 
competitiveness and hence encourage higher short run production in anticipation of 
increased exports of goods and services.  Following substantial foreign direct 
investment in China over past decades that has directly augmented the capital stock, 
multinational corporations produce a sizeable part of annual output for export.   
 
On the aggregate demand or expenditure side,  
I C A + =                                                                                            (3a) 
* * * I C A + =                                                                                       (3b) 
where,  is absorption or aggregate demand, C is consumption, I is investment. 
* A , A
 
The trade account balance (or current account balance absent income paid abroad) 
measures the divergence between national output and expenditure, such that   
                                                                                                (4a)  CAS A Y = −
* * * CAD Y A = −                                                                                            (4b) 
where   is national output or income,   is the current account surplus and 
 is the counterpart trading partner external deficit. 





Exchange Rate, Spending and Income Relations 
The aggregate demand functions can then be written as 
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φ γ (5b) 
Aggregate demand is influenced by domestic interest rates,  , the fiscal policy stance, 
, (with a rise in   implying fiscal expansion) and  residents’ wealth,  .  In turn, 
domestic interest rates are influenced by short run monetary conditions,
i
γ γ φ
, (a rise in  M
implying monetary expansion).  M
  
Total expenditure in an open economy includes spending on imported goods and 
services whose prices are initially set in foreign currency.  A stronger exchange rate 
lowers the domestic currency price of imports, increasing import demand and total 
expenditure.  Hence, a downward sloping aggregate expenditure schedule  AD  for 
China can be drawn in exchange rate-expenditure space as shown in the left panel of 










As China’s national product includes that part of output sold abroad as exports, total 
output is positively related to competitiveness, which, given the assumption about 
short run price level stability, reflects nominal exchange rate movements.  Hence is 
represented by an upward sloping   schedule in exchange rate-output space, as also 
shown in the left panel of Figure 1. 
AS
 
Divergences between domestic expenditure and output manifest not only as external 
imbalances but as excess demand or supply of foreign currency.  In the absence of 
capital flows, the current account is balanced and the nominal exchange rate is at 
equilibrium at the point where national expenditure equals national output. The 
weaker is the exchange rate, the higher is the excess supply for goods and services, 
and hence the greater the economy's net supply of foreign currency due to current 
account surpluses.   
 
The effective exchange rate for China against the weighted exchange rate of its 
trading partners is the inverse of trading partners’ exchange rate against the yuan, that 
is  e E 1 =  , so that a depreciation of the yuan is an appreciation of trading partner 
currencies.  Hence, if the vertical axis in the right panel measures the same exchange 
rate as the left panel but is read from the top down, the aggregate expenditure and 
production schedules for trading partners in the right panel have the opposite slopes to 
those shown in the left panel.  The trade accounts of China and its Western trading 
partners balance where aggregate supply and demand schedules intersect at nominal 





4.  Rapid Growth, Global Imbalances and Exchange Rate Misalignment   
Having established these foundations, it is possible to show how strictly 
macroeconomic factors simultaneously determine external account imbalances, inter-
regional capital flows and shared exchange rates.  First, China’s rapid manufacturing 
driven development implies that in relative terms its domestic output growth outpaces 
its domestic expenditure growth, so that exports exceed imports and the trade surplus 
rises.  This is conveyed by a rightward shift of the   schedule in the left panel of 
Figure 2.   
AS
 
Other things equal, higher domestic output growth (inclusive of the output of 
multinational corporations producing for export only), relative to domestic 
expenditure growth, appreciates China’s exchange rate and depreciates the currencies 










Figure 2 – Exchange Rate Misalignment, Imbalances  




However, to avoid the loss of competitiveness that a nominal appreciation entails, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) purchases foreign currency.  This is invested in 
treasury bonds which are added to foreign reserves.  While the exchange of yuan for 
foreign currency in the foreign exchange market, reduces the money supply of its 
Western trading partners, other things equal, the subsequent purchase of foreign 
currency denominated bonds with the foreign currency acquired by the PBC leaves 
foreign money supplies unchanged.   
 
However, the excess demand for bonds pushes up their price and lowers interest rates 
in trading partners.  In turn, lower interest rates sustain higher expenditure than 
otherwise in trading partner economies.  Consequently, capital outflow from China 
ensures its external surplus matches the capital inflow and external deficit of its 
trading partners.  Since China is accumulating foreign currency reserves by running a 
trade surplus at a pegged exchange rate, the external deficit of its trading partners is 
essentially Made in China, more specifically by the PBC’s exchange rate policy.   
 
With China’s output growing faster than spending, the increased import demand from 
trading partners is satisfied by higher exports from China.  Again however, if the yuan 
was free to move against the exchange rates of trading partners, including against the 
US dollar, it would appreciate and they would depreciate in nominal terms.  Such 
exchange rate adjustment would automatically ensure the trade accounts of the two 
regions remained in balance.  Yet, China’s tightly managed exchange rate policy 
prevents this.   
 




Western trading partners that increases aggregate spending relative to production.   
Suppose there is additional bond-financed fiscal expansion in trading partners.  From 
a point of initial trade balance this increases expenditure, shifts out the  schedule 
in the right panel of Figure 2, and widens the trade deficit, other things equal.  By 
investing in bonds issued by Western trading partner governments the PBC ensures 
lower foreign interest rates, thereby sustaining increased expenditure and external 
deficits abroad.   
* AD
 
Figure 2 also reveals important, though hitherto neglected, macroeconomic 
consequences of pegging the yuan.  Specifically, by maintaining a misaligned 
exchange rate, China’s exports, short run output (and hence employment levels) are 
higher than if the PBC had allowed foreign exchange market pressures to appreciate 
the yuan.  Hence, exchange rate management becomes an instrument for stimulating 
higher short run output growth as indicated at level   in Figure 2.    1 Y
 
This exceeds the level of   that would obtain under a fully flexible exchange rate 
system.  Accordingly, China’s pegged exchange rate policy may be seen as conferring 
a form of trade protection to domestic manufacturing industry, including 
multinational enterprises, that has been termed “exchange rate protectionism” (See 
Corden 1982 and Schwartz 2005) .  
2 Y
 
At the same time, despite China’s very high domestic output growth, its exchange rate 
policy results in domestic consumption being lower than otherwise.  In turn, this 




households could potentially enjoy, are sub-optimal.    
 
Meanwhile, in Western trading partner economies a pegged yuan implies that current 
account deficits arise.  More importantly however, an inflexible exchange rate results 
in short run national output and employment, particularly in the manufacturing 
segment of the tradables sector, being lower than if the exchange rate was flexible.  In 
the right side panel of Figure 2, other things equal, in the face of China’s relatively 
faster growth, trading partner GDP remains at   while expenditure increases to .  
Under a pegged exchange rate, the output-expenditure difference is the collective 





Yet with a fully flexible exchange rate regime, exchange rates would realin with real 
sector consequences for both China and its trading partners.  For instance, trading 
partner GDP would rise to   and both consumption and investment spending would 
fall compared with the pegged rate outcome such that, collectively, trading partner 
output would equal expenditure and current accounts with China would balance.   
With lower consumption and higher output in trading partner economies, domestic 
saving rates would also rise unambiguously and investment fall to ensure saving-
investment equality consistent with current account balance. 
* Y2
 
Contrary to the dictates of standard macroeconomic theory, strong rises in US 
national expenditure may no longer be strongly associated with commensurate output 
and employment expansion (hence so-called ‘jobless recoveries’).  This framework 




expenditure simply widens external imbalances in the first instance. 
 
If trading partner bonds are subscribed at the prevailing domestic interest rates, their 
external deficit is fully funded by excess Chinese saving over investment.  The capital 
inflow to trading partners (capital outflow from China) allows lower global interest 
rates.  Capital inflow sustains higher expenditure in trading partners at the subsequent 
cost to national income of interest paid to China on outstanding public debt, whereas 
China’s national output is augmented by interest income received on foreign currency 
bond holdings.   
 
5.  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
This paper has proposed an alternative international monetary framework for 
examining the trade balance and real sector consequences of exchange rate 
realignment.  Founded on the distinction between national output and expenditure, an 
important innovation of the approach is that it reveals how China’s inflexible 
exchange rate bestows additional output gains on China at trading partners’ expense 
and that exchange rate misalignment is central to global imbalances.       
 
Maintaining undervalued currencies through heavy foreign exchange market 
intervention also has monetary implications.  Specifically, the purchase of foreign 
currency by the PBC increases China’s money supply which should lower domestic 
interest rates in the first instance and shift the 
* AD  right.  In theory, this should bring 
about an automatic correction of the excess of production over expenditure and 





In practice however, the following factors explain why this automatic correction 
process may not occur.  First, the PBC sterilises foreign exchange rate intervention by 
issuing local currency denominated bills to offset the liquidity effects of intervention.  
This limits expenditure by maintaining a floor under domestic interest rates.  At the 
same time China’s highly regulated capital account facilitates sterilised intervention 
via controls restricting financial inflows.   
 
Second, under conditions of very rapid output growth, money supply increases need 
not be fully sterilised because strong real money demand growth permits seigniorage 
without inflationary consequences.  Third, the automatic monetary adjustment 
mechanism under pegged exchange rates is less likely to operate the weaker and less 
developed is the economy’s banking and financial system.  Taken together, these 
factors appear to have negated the inflationary consequences of China’s pegged 
exchange rate and allowed it to sustain huge external surpluses matched by deficits 
abroad.   
 
Several authors (Hausmann, Panizza and Stein, 2000, Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) have 
argued that pegged exchange rates are essentially adopted by emerging economies 
due to a ‘fear of floating’ that stems from concerns about financial stability, policy 
credibility and currency mismatches.  However, this model shows that a pegged 
exchange rate regime may instead be favored on the grounds that it provides a 
mechanism for maximizing output growth.  Moreover, the impact on the financial 
sector of exchange rate appreciation is likely to be minimal in light of the limited 
foreign exchange exposure of the banking sector and a growing capacity to hedge 




It has been argued by the Chinese authorities (IMF 2006) that an undervalued 
exchange rate is not primarily responsible for the huge trade surplus of recent years.  
Rather, China’s external surplus has been mainly due to the economy’s openness to 
foreign direct investment and production by multinational companies for export 
utilizing cheap and abundant labour.   Yet, as the framework of this paper shows, 
while the significant presence of export-oriented multinationals in China may indeed 
be boosting its trade surplus, this is consistent with the exchange rate being seriously 
misaligned.  
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